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Economic Structure, Policy, and Growth 
 
 Almost a decade into the twenty-first century, absolute poverty still 
pervades outside the industrialized world. Helping poor people in poor countries 
improve their levels of living is on the short list of international policy goals. The 
air is full of ideas about how poverty should be analyzed and attacked. Although 
there have been some success stories, particularly in East Asia, the unhappy 
truth is that anti-poverty programs in developing countries have quite often failed 
or have had limited success.1  
The reason why is that they did not enable poor economies to generate 
long-term growth of real per capita income. A useful rule of thumb is that 
developing and transition economies should sustain at least 2% annual per 
capita real growth of gross domestic product or GDP. That would stop the gap 
separating their standards of living from the industrial world’s from widening even 
further, and 3% or more would gradually reduce it. A 2% per capita growth rate 
can make a big dent in poverty by increasing average income by 22% over 10 
years and 49% over 20. In addition, growth can only address poverty concerns if 
it generates new jobs to keep pace with a rising labor force. 
Relatively few developing and transition economies have been able to 
mount steady growth at 2% or higher for long time periods. The quarter century 
                                                 
1 At times we refer to developing and transition economies separately, but 
generally use the terms “developing” countries or economies and “developing 
world” to refer to both groups. 
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or so after the second oil and interest rate shocks of 1979 was particularly critical 
in this regard, as many developing countries started to face long-term stagnation 
or even regression. Our task in this book is to ascertain reasons why, and to 
suggest policy initiatives to offset the difficulties that we will uncover. Our focus is 
the links between economic structure, policy, and growth. The emphasis on the 
term “structure” is essential here, as our analysis is deeply embedded in a 
“structuralist” tradition of development economics, which we view as providing 
the best way to understand the problems that the people in poor countries have 
to confront in trying to reshape their national economies. 
Since the mid-1970s but, particularly, the 1980s, and under the strong 
influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, there was a 
significant change in the overall framework for development policies, from the 
tradition of strong state intervention that had prevailed after the post-Second 
World War toward what came to be called the “Washington consensus”. This 
orthodox framework asserts that economic liberalization – that is, letting the 
market take over from the state—is the answer to speeding up growth in the 
developing world. This recommendation was followed, to a greater or lesser 
extent, in developing and transition economies, and they experienced a poor 
growth record. 
Our framework departs from these orthodox views, arguing in particular 
that there is clearly something missing from mainstream analysis: it omits 
structure and structural change. This may sound paradoxical because the main 
orthodox slogan was “structural reform”, the term frequently used instead of 
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“economic liberalization”, which is what it was meant to imply. The use of the 
term “structural” in these programs is entirely different from the older usage, 
followed in this book and explained below. 
Poverty is central to this distinction. The most widely publicized anti-
poverty program today is the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) effort 
sponsored by the United Nations. It calls for roughly doubling foreign aid to the 
poorest economies over the next 10 years. The aims are exemplary. An 
incomplete list of the MDGs ranges from halving by 2015 the levels of extreme 
poverty and hunger that developing countries had in 1990, providing universal 
primary education, sharply reducing infant and maternal mortality, increasing 
access to water and sanitation, and ensuring environmental sustainability.  
We certainly accept these merit social goals, but present two caveats. 
First, there is a major question about whether foreign aid flows will increase from 
around $100 billion per year in 2007 to the levels required to meet the MDGs. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that the measured aid flows include 
“debt relief” to the poorest countries, which is not really new aid, as well as 
technical assistance delivered by professionals from donor countries, which may 
be useful but is very costly. Such outlays are not really funds available for the 
recipient countries to spend on achieving the MDGs.  
Secondly, the emphasis on merit social goals hides the fact that the key to 
reducing poverty is growth of the purchasing power of the poor. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, international aid by itself is unlikely to make sustained growth in the 
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poorest economies come about. Growth accompanied and supported by 
structural change is what is needed. 
 How economic policy can be utilized in diverse structural circumstances to 
generate growth is the question at hand. The complications to be addressed are 
summarized this chapter, which serves as an introduction to the chapters to 
come. 
Economic Growth 
 To begin, we should define terms: economic structure, policy, and growth. 
The latter is measured in traditional fashion as an increase in real GDP (either as 
a level or per capita), both economy-wide and for specific productive sectors. 
What is this “real GDP”? 
Measuring Economic Output 
 The basic idea about GDP measurement comes from John Maynard 
Keynes (1936). In his General Theory, he explicitly embraced double-entry 
bookkeeping for the entire economy by postulating that national income = 
national output. As discussed below, in an economy hypothetically closed to 
foreign trade an equivalent assertion is that saving = investment. For Keynes, 
investment was the driving force with saving adjusting to meet it via changes in 
the level of output. 
National accounting had been proposed many times before, but Keynes 
was the first to adopt income and output as joint measures of economic value 
(Mirowski, 1989). The national income and product accounts – or national 
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accounts, for short— can be extended to incorporate mutually offsetting financial 
transactions in the flows of funds accounts, which add up over time to national 
financial balance sheets. National balance sheets refer only to the assets and 
liabilities of residents in a country vis-à-vis residents in the rest of the world; this 
is the sense in which we will use the term here.  Asset and liability positions do 
not usually offset each other, giving rise to a situation in which there are either 
net national foreign assets (the residents of the country are net investors in the 
rest of the world) or net foreign liabilities, the more common situation in the 
developing world (and in the US, with some developing countries now being net 
lenders).  
In the simplest version of the national accounts, the value of output is 
equal to the sum of all forms of spending: private consumption, investment, 
government spending, and exports. Producing the output generates income flows 
which go to workers, recipients of profit incomes, proprietors such as peasant 
farmers and small merchants, and the rest of the world (via imports into the local 
economy and transfers such as profit remittances going out). Much of 
macroeconomics is about rules to determine how the system adjusts to bring 
equality between income (or output) and spending. Examples are presented 
throughout this book. 
 The double entries suggest that GDP can be calculated as a sum of either 
incomes or spending. Most advanced economies do it both ways and report a 
“discrepancy” (usually in the neighborhood of 1%) between the two sets of 
estimates. Many poor countries attempt only the output side and compute some 
 5
  
component of spending (usually private consumption) as a “residual.” Sectoral 
output or “value-added” estimates themselves may be residuals as well, each 
computed as a total value of gross output minus costs of intermediate inputs.2 
GDP from the output side is the sum of levels of value-added across economic 
activities. Value-added in turn should be the sum of payments to “primary factors 
of production” such as labor, capital, entrepreneurship, etc. – that is, incomes.  
GDP estimates are blends of diverse economic indicators of varying 
reliability mixed into one overall system of accounts. The cooking procedures 
differ greatly across countries and time. However, for better or worse, economic 
policy discussion is always framed nowadays in terms of the national accounts. 
 GDP must be estimated using current market prices. “Real” GDP is such 
an estimate at current prices divided by some price index,3 in principle 
constructed in such a way as to be consistent with the overall accounting 
framework. Numbers about economic growth are always based on real output 
computed in this fashion. In turn, if total GDP is growing at a rate of (say) 4% per 
year, real per capital GDP must be growing at 4% minus the rate of population 
growth.  
A related concept is average “productivity” or real output divided by some 
real input, say a measure of labor, capital, or energy employed in production. 
Estimates of labor come from employment statistics, capital is the sum of levels 
of real net investment (gross fixed capital formation less depreciation) over time. 
                                                 
2 In simple terms, think of the value of bread a baker sells over a year minus 
costs of inputs for its production (flour, water, electricity, etc.). 
3 Again, in simple terms, a “real” economic magnitude means a value (sales of 
bread, for example) divided by a price (price of bread). 
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Productivity growth is the growth rate of output minus the growth rate of the 
relevant input. A lot of the discussion to follow (in Chapter 3 in particular) centers 
on different measures of productivity growth. 
Supply Side Considerations 
 Growth rates of labor and capital productivity are the numbers most 
commonly considered. Income per capita cannot increase without rising labor 
productivity, but what about capital? For most economies, the evidence suggests 
that the output/capital ratio is fairly stable (as it is across business cycles in the 
US) or else tends to fall. Four observations follow: 
 The first is that one can show using simple algebra (see Appendix 3.2) 
that the ratio of capital productivity to labor productivity must be equal to the ratio 
of employed labor to employed capital. During recent economic growth in East 
Asia, the labor/capital ratio decreased because of the high rate of investment in 
those economies. With labor productivity growth rates well over 2% per year, the 
equation just mentioned shows that, based on a “theorem of accounting”, capital 
productivity either had to fall or stagnate. Critics of the East Asian development 
model stress that it is “inefficient” because of falling capital productivity. The 
assertion is meaningless, because it turns an algebraic artifact into a diagnosis of 
economic malaise. The same empty accusations apply to many developed 
economies such as Japan, the US, or UK during their years of fast growth, as 
they all experienced falling or stagnating capital productivity (see Table 2.8 in 
Foley and Michl, 1999).    
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 Second, mainstream economists put a great deal of emphasis on “total 
factor productivity growth” (TFPG) as proposed by Robert Solow (1957). TFPG is 
a weighted average of labor and capital productivity growth rates, with the 
weights being the shares in value-added of payments to providers of labor and 
capital. The problem is that the weights are virtually impossible to compute in 
developing economies. There the data typically show that labor remunerations 
may be somewhere around 20-40% of GDP in low to middle income economies, 
with recognizable payments to capital in a similar range. The rest, calculated by 
employing the residual approach, goes to “proprietors” such as peasant farmers, 
urban services providers, etc. Which fractions of their incomes should be 
attributed to capital (including land) and labor is very difficult to say. It is better to 
look at trends in labor and capital productivity separately to try to figure things 
out. 
 Third, the standard approach, devised by Frank Ramsey (1928) and 
Solow (1956), is to explain output growth solely from the side of supply, stressing 
the “contributions” of TFPG plus labor and capital growth rates to the total. The 
capital stock grows as a result of each year’s flow of investment, assumed to be 
determined by available saving under conditions of full employment.4 Labor 
supply is supposed to be set by demographic developments. TFPG follows from 
unspecified “technological factors.”  
                                                 
4 The Ramsey and Solow models differ mainly in their hypotheses regarding 




 An alternative view is that, for reasons discussed below, labor productivity 
is likely to grow more rapidly when output growth accelerates (and perhaps when 
real wages rise, inducing firms to use labor inputs more effectively). Output itself 
may be driven by increases in demand when labor is not fully employed and, in 
particular, not fully employed in the “modern” sector of the economy. This is the 
typical situation in developing countries, where a large “subsistence” labor force 
in “traditional” rural and “informal” urban activities exists alongside the “modern” 
sectors of the economy, as emphasized by Lewis (1954).  
Under these conditions, a demand push generated by external or 
domestic factors will increase productivity growth, by allowing dynamic modern 
sectors to draw upon subsistence labor – which, using the analogy proposed by 
Marx, operates as a sort of “reserve army”, but of the under- rather than the un-
employed.  Shifting labor from low to high-productivity activities will by itself lead 
to an increase in labor productivity, but this effect is compounded by the fact that, 
as we will see below, a faster rate in the rate of growth of production in the 
modern sector will lead to productivity improvements. Faster productivity growth 
is therefore the joint effect of the reduction of underemployment and 
improvements in productivity generated by dynamic growth in the modern sector. 
On the other hand, if demand is weak, the economy will adapt through the 
absorption of the surplus labor by traditional and informal activities, thus 
generating a reduction in overall labor productivity.  
Under these conditions, weak productivity performance is the result rather 
than the cause of weak output and demand growth. More generally, output and 
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productivity growth rates are jointly determined. Employment growth then follows 
as the difference between them. It may fall short of the expansion of the labor 
force, or even lead to a situation of “jobless growth.” 
In a successful development experience, employment growth in the 
modern sector should exceed the growth of the total labor force, thus allowing 
increasing absorption of the underemployed into higher productivity activities. But 
the opposite may also happen, not just because growth is weak but also because 
the economy is structurally predisposed toward jobless growth. This situation is 
not uncommon in mineral exporting economies where the most dynamic sectors 
create very few jobs, or during trade liberalization episodes when firms facing 
rising external competition increase productivity at the micro level basically by 
shedding workers. 
This reading of the evidence, introduced by Nicholas Kaldor (1978, 
chapter 4, based on a lecture from 1966) is used extensively in Chapter 8. 
According to Kaldor’s analysis, physical capital serves as one of the major 
vehicles for bringing new technologies into the system with its growth ultimately 
regulated by the growth rate of investment demand and saving adjusting via 
change in output as suggested by Keynes. Higher investment lead to productivity 
increases as it incorporates new technologies and product innovations (Kaldor, 
1978, chapters 1 and 2). Output expansion generates in turn productivity 
increases through the exploitation of static and dynamic economies of scale, 
associated in the latter case to learning-by-doing and technological innovations 
induced by production experience.  
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Labor underemployment thus allows investment dynamics to play the 
leading role in determining the rate of growth of both GDP and productivity. In 
open economies, the determining demand factor may be exports or external 
financing. These two variables play a crucial role in macroeconomic dynamics in 
developing countries. Interestingly, as we will see, they are also key 
determinants of aggregate supply when foreign exchange becomes scare. 
As is often the case in macroeconomics, the data do not suffice to 
distinguish between the theories, but there may be a presumption in favor of the 
demand-oriented analysis when we see major variations in underemployment. In 
any case, the case for the traditional supply-oriented interpretation is not 
overwhelming in developing countries. When supply constraints are important, it 
is generally foreign exchange rather than the capital stock or the available labor 
force that plays the crucial role. 
What the data can certainly do, as we will see in Chapter 3, is rule out any 
strong association between other supply-side factors, such as increases in 
average years of schooling (“human capital accumulation”) and high levels of 
direct foreign investment, with the growth rate of per capita income.  
Finally, under the threat of global warming, energy use from fossil fuels is 
of growing policy concern. As with capital, one can show that the growth rate of 
labor productivity must be equal to the growth rate of energy productivity plus the 
growth rate of the energy/labor ratio. 
The ratio of fossil fuel energy use to labor ranges from 0.49 terajoules per 
person-year in industrialized economies (0.61 in the US) to 0.01 in Sub-Saharan 
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Africa.5 Between 1990 and 2004, energy/labor ratios were growing at rates 
exceeding 3% per year in the rapidly growing Asian economies. In industrialized 
countries, the ratio grew at 0.1% after decreasing at -0.3% per year between 
1970 and 1990 (see full details in Chapter 3). 
Rough calculations using a study on carbon dioxide emissions by climate 
experts (Socolow and Pacala, 2006) suggest that to hold global greenhouse gas 
emissions constant, developing country energy/labor ratios might have to 
decrease by 1% per year.6 Whether such a shift in energy use patterns will be 
even remotely possible, without seriously undermining efforts to increase 
productivity, is very much an open question.  
Economic Structure 
 The concept of economic structure refers to the composition of production 
activities, the associated patterns of specialization in international trade,  the 
technological capabilities of the economy, including the educational level of the 
labor force, the structure of ownership of factors of production, the nature and 
development of basic state institutions, and the degree of development and 
constraints under which certain markets operate (the absence of certain 
                                                 
5 One joule is the energy required to lift a small (100 gram) apple one meter 
against the earth’s gravity. One terajoule is roughly equivalent to 7700 gallons of 
gasoline or 31 tons of coal. Thinking in terms of power, one watt equals one joule 
of energy use per second. Dividing by the number of seconds in a year shows 
that an American worker utilizes 19.3 kilowatts of power to produce his or her 
contribution to real GDP. An African uses 300 watts. 
6 For further details on the estimates of energy/labor ratios for developed and 
developing countries see Taylor (2008a). 
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segments of the financial market, or the presence of a large underemployed 
labor force, for example).  
These basic factors are reflected in relationships among the numbers that 
appear in the national, trade, fiscal, monetary, and financial accounts along with 
indicators of employment, educational levels and energy use. They are also 
reflected in the network of production and demand linkages among sectors in an 
economy – both backward and forward linkages in Hirschman’s (1958) well 
known terminology— or, indeed, the lack or destruction of them. 
Among these relationships, some of them have important distributive 
implications. Structuralists adopt, in this case, the “classical” approach of Smith, 
Ricardo, Malthus, and Marx in focusing on collective actors – organized groups 
or classes such as capitalists, landlords, and peasants. Relationships among 
collective actors help to determine the way both state and market institutions are 
framed, which in turn influence relative prices and the income distribution (think 
of Malthus’s theory of population and Marx’s reserve army of the unemployed), 
as well as technical progress, investment and aggregate supply. On the other 
sides of markets are factors that determine the level of effective demand (“animal 
spirits” of investing firms for Keynes) and also the pace of productivity growth. As 
in Kaldor’s model sketched above, the economy’s position depends on these 
interacting “supply” and “demand” systems. 
Contemporary structuralists also follow Keynes in emphasizing how 
accounting restrictions among economic actors – essentially, what is bought 
must be sold (the gist of the national accounts system) or what is borrowed must 
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be lent (the flows of funds accounts) -- play a crucial role in determining how 
aggregate demand and supply forces interact.  
Such macroeconomic accounting balances underlie Keynes’s basic insight 
that often, but not always, the level of effective demand determines aggregate 
supply. As we have pointed out, in a developing country this rule most often 
breaks down when there are strict limits on available foreign exchange.  
Underlying both demand and supply are also shifting financial decisions 
by collective actors such as the real estate and stock market speculators and 
hedge funds that can strongly affect the overall outcome. The external crises 
described in the following sections are telling examples. The economy’s financial 
structure strongly influences the ebb and flow of transactions within it. 
As will be clear throughout this book, a critical structural issue for 
developing countries are their trade and financial linkages with the rest of the 
world – its “insertion” into the world economy, to use the terminology of Latin 
American structuralism. This is influenced, in turn, by the structure of the global 
economy, and the particular “asymmetries” that characterize it – its “center-
periphery” dimensions, to again use the terminology from this influential group of 
structuralists.  
Two  sorts of asymmetries are particularly important in this regard: (a) the 
fact that most technology generation is concentrated in industrial countries, which 
determines the direction of technology flows but also the patterns of 
specialization in the production of goods and services with different technological 
content; and (b) the facts that the world currencies are the currencies of the 
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major international economic powers, that international financial intermediation is 
concentrated in those countries, and that developing countries are either cut off 
entirely from those capital flows or are subject to strong  upward and downward 
swings in the availability and costs of  external financing (Ocampo and Martin, 
2003).7 
Production Structure and Growth 
There are two views regarding the role and implications of production 
structure for growth. The conventional narrative is that structural change in the 
patterns of production, expressed numerically in terms of variations in sectoral 
contributions to output, employment, investment, and patterns of specialization, 
is just a side effect of growth. As the economy expands and markets enlarge, 
new demands require new production processes which come into being by 
attracting inputs such as labor and capital. The structural configuration adjusts to 
incorporate novel activities or to enlarge existing ones. Growing economies 
almost always move from primary to secondary and further toward tertiary 
sectors.  
The alternative view is that these patterns of structural change are not just 
a byproduct of growth but rather are among the prime movers. There are 
immediate policy implications. Because production structure must change if 
growth and development are to proceed, conscious choice of policies that will 
                                                 
7 A third asymmetry is the fact that labor, and particularly unskilled labor, is much 




drive the transformation of the system towards certain sectors is essential for 
long-term economic expansion.  
This insight is ignored by most contemporary economic theory. But it 
arises from observation and analysis of economic performance of developing 
countries around the world in the past and present. Economists who have been 
trained within the structuralist tradition share this perspective, holding that 
development requires economic transformation or the “ability of an economy to 
constantly generate new dynamic activities” (Ocampo, 2005), particularly those 
characterized by higher productivity and increasing returns to scale of production 
as reflected into decreasing costs per unit of output. This logic underlies Kaldor’s 
growth model discussed above and in chapter 8. 
One key aspect of growth in the poorest countries is that agriculture 
dominates the economy. Therefore its productivity growth is crucial, as in sub-
Saharan Africa now. But productivity increases in the sector are significantly 
constrained by lack of access to modern technology, natural factors such as low 
fertility land, and mostly by its intrinsic inability to offer increasing returns. Hence, 
per capita output growth at 2% requires even higher growth rates of labor 
productivity in leading sectors (assuming that the ratio of employed labor to the 
population is fairly stable). 
 At higher income levels, the leading sector(s) must offer increasing returns 
and opportunities for robust output growth in response to demand. As Chapter 3 
herein and a raft of historical studies demonstrate, a clear pattern of structural 
change emerges from the data for economies (today mostly in East and South 
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Asia) which sustain rapid growth. Historically, manufacturing has almost always 
served as the engine for productivity growth (India with its information processing 
boom is an intriguing recent exception), though not job creation. For a sector or 
the entire economy to generate employment, its per capita growth rate of 
demand has to exceed its productivity growth. Net job creation usually takes 
place in services.  
 As discussed in Chapter 4, patterns of international trade also shift as 
economies growth richer. Their exports become more technically sophisticated 
and switch away from raw materials toward manufactured products, especially in 
the recent period with the explosion of assembly manufacturing around the world. 
Import composition also shifts in response to overall changes in the basic 
structure of the economy. Indeed, those changes in the pattern of specialization 
in international trade are an essential part of the transformation of production 
structures, a fact that has been highlighted by the role that the terms “import 
substitution” and “export diversification” have played in development debates. 
One key question, in this regard, is whether an economy can pass through the 
raw material and assembly export stages to sell products abroad which have a 
high value-added content at home. 
Development Policy 
The links between growth and production and trade structures have 
profound implications for development policy. There is an insight that was placed 
at the center of development writing from the 1940s to the 1960s but can be 
traced back to before Adam Smith. It has been recently restated by Reinert 
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(2006) and formalized by Ros (2000) and Rada (2007) following classical 
development economics and Kaldor, respectively, as well as the essentials of 
Lewis’ labor surplus model. It says that the economy can usefully be viewed as a 
combination of increasing returns sectors and more plodding constant or 
decreasing returns activities.8 Dynamics between markets, forces of innovation, 
finance, and productive sectors can produce virtuous circles of growth and 
development based on decreasing costs per unit output. Smith realized but did 
not emphasize that the invisible hand may need assistance in promoting the 
development of such virtuous circles. As Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List 
pointed out explicitly a few years later, the conscious action (the visible hand) of 
the policy maker is often required.  
The goal is to stimulate the sectors with increasing returns while shifting 
resources from elsewhere in the economy. The patterns of productivity and 
employment growth sketched above and presented in detail in Chapter 3 
precisely represent this sort of structural change. The now industrialized 
economies succeeded at this task. The question is how to design policies that 
will facilitate similar processes elsewhere. Historically, the state has played a 
crucial role. 
For many decades, there was pro-active developmentalist state 
intervention in the now-industrialized economies (Chang, 2002) and in twentieth 
century success cases in the developing world (Amsden, 2003). Consider the 
                                                 
8  The Kaldor and Rada models are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. A non-
formalized version of these models was presented in Ocampo and Taylor (1998) 
and Ocampo (2005). 
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United States in the nineteenth century. Booming agricultural exports prevented 
a foreign exchange bottleneck. There were enormous public subsidies (with 
enormous corruption) to support investment in canals and railroads and the 
highest tariffs in the world to protect industry. Entrepreneurs from Rockefeller to 
the “Robber Barons”9 abounded, paying scant heed to conventional property 
rights (if only because they had well remunerated judges under their control). 
For many developing countries, possibilities of pursuing any such strategy 
effectively disappeared in the final quarter of the twentieth century with the 
metastasis of the Washington consensus. Under the tutelage of World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, countries moved to liberalize their external current 
and capital accounts along with domestic financial and (to a lesser extent) labor 
markets. They also privatized public enterprises, de-emphasized or many times 
entirely dismantled industrial policy interventions, and allowed a greater private 
sector role in general. Fiscal austerity figured in many programs sponsored by 
the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
In effect, policy makers in developing countries had their hands tied by the 
liberalization process – in the areas of macroeconomics and industrial policy 
among others. In a currently popular phrase, their “policy space” contracted 
immensely. One task for the future is to devise institutional changes that can 
open it back up. Suggestions are presented throughout the book. 
                                                 
9 The term “Robber Barons” in the US originated in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The idea is that “business leaders in the United States from 
about 1865 to 1900 were, on the whole, a set of avaricious rascals who habitually 
cheated and robbed investors and consumers, corrupted government, fought 
ruthlessly among themselves, and in general carried on predatory activities 




Foreign Exchange Constraints and Financial Structures 
Structural factors relevant to the growth process are not limited to 
production and the forms of insertion into the global economy. Constraints on 
macroeconomic policy are also very important. The two most critical refer to 
external and domestic financing. 
At already pointed out, the limited availability of hard currency is perhaps 
the crucial bottleneck for many developing countries at different stages of their 
development process because it can hold down both supply and demand. The 
lack of foreign exchange during economic downturns, due to falling export 
revenues and/or reduced access to external financing, forces authorities many 
times to adopt macroeconomic policies that end up reducing economic activity  
and employment. On the contrary, if foreign exchange were readily available, 
effective demand could increase and it would stimulate private sector investment 
and innovation. How to relax the foreign exchange constraint has therefore been 
a perennial preoccupation for the economic authorities in developing country 
capitals almost everywhere. 
Domestic finance is needed to support investment in both working and 
fixed capital. However, commercial banks in many developing countries do not 
provide even necessary working capital, particularly for small firms, and are 
particularly bad at providing long-term financing for new fixed capital formation. 
For this reason, the state has frequently had to step in to provide financing, often 
through the vehicle of development banks targeting productive investment. 
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The development of local financial capital markets – stock and bond 
markets and associated transactions in derivatives – is also limited in many 
developing countries, a fact that has major implications for running both fiscal 
and monetary policy. If there is no adequate way to finance public sector deficits 
by selling Treasury bonds in the domestic capital market, authorities may force 
commercial banks to buy them or resort directly to central bank financing, thus 
generating a complex and undesirable interaction between fiscal deficits and 
money creation.  
Furthermore, most advanced forms of monetary policy depend critically on 
the existence of a domestic capital market in which the central bank can actively 
sell and buy bonds. Macroeconomic policy is significantly constrained in terms of 
available instruments when there is no developed domestic capital market. This 
issue is discussed extensively in Chapter 6. 
 
The Macroeconomic Environment and Growth 
 A supportive macroeconomic environment for growth is essential. The 
details have varied greatly in successful countries but a few general observations 
apply. They are developed in more detail in Chapter 7. The key point is that there 
can be structural limitations on policy freedom in developing countries, even 
before restrictions that donors and international financial institutions may impose. 
Supposing that growth of production and employment is the major policy 
goal, then “macro” prices, in particular the real exchange rate should not be “too 
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low” 10 and the real interest rate should not be “too high.” Low, positive real 
interest rates stimulate investment and help balance the financial system. A weak 
(“high”) exchange rate holds imports down and helps an economy push into new 
export lines.  Stability of macro prices is also desirable. If they swing rapidly up 
and down, medium-term business planning is impossible. In practice, maintaining 
a favorable configuration of macro prices is generally not an easy task. 
 “External balance” is also a key issue. Suppose for concreteness that an 
economy is running a current account deficit (that is exports and current 
payments from abroad such as emigrant remittances are less than imports plus 
payments such as interest and profit remittances going out). The economy must 
borrow externally to cover the deficit (even most foreign aid is conventionally 
treated as loans). Incoming new lending from the rest of the world is positive11.
 Moreover, some group(s) within the economy must be doing the 
counterpart borrowing to match this lending from abroad. The simplest 
separation is between the public and private sectors – one or the other or both 
must be running a deficit to absorb financial capital inflows from abroad. In other 
words, private expenditure minus income (or investment minus saving) plus the 
consolidated government deficit must equal the foreign deficit. 
                                                 
10 We express the exchange rate in standard fashion as units of home currency 
(pesos or rupees, for example) per one unit of foreign currency (dollar or euro). 
When it is calculated in this fashion, an appreciated or stronger exchange rate 
has a lower value.  
11 As discussed above, when foreign net borrowing is negative the country 
actually becomes a net lender to other countries (curiously enough, many times 




Finally, as discussed extensively in the following chapters, unstable 
external financing plays a crucial role in the determination of macroeconomic 
balances and dynamics in developing countries. A major challenge is that 
macroeconomic policies are pushed toward behaving in a “pro-cyclical” way. 
That is, they reinforce both the boom and the crisis, and thus magnify the effects 
of external oscillations on the domestic economy. Macroeconomic “policy space” 
is limited by one of the very factors that determine the business cycle: unstable 
capital flows (Stiglitz, et. al., 2006). 
 As will be seen, the interplay among macro prices, external balance, and 
pro-cyclicality can be quite complex and strongly conditions possibilities for 
economic growth. Two illustrative scenarios help to make this point: external 
shocks and unstable international capital flows. 
External Shocks 
   After an external crisis generated by reduced export earnings and/or 
limited external financing (in many cases these two macroeconomic shocks 
coincide), an economy almost always is forced to cut its external deficit or 
increase its surplus. Since net borrowing from abroad must fall or even become 
negative, the domestic private and public sectors have to cut back their 
borrowing or become net lenders. The private sector can curtail consumption and 
investment and the government can slash spending and raise taxes. The 
economy goes into recession and may take a very long time to recover. The “lost 
decade” in Latin America after the debt crisis that erupted around 1980 is a 
striking example, as illustrated in Chapter 2. Based on an empirical analysis of 
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net borrowing flows in Chapter 5, a “three-gap” model devised to analyze such 
contingencies is presented in Chapter 7. 
There is also a risk if “too much” foreign exchange comes in. There can be 
a spending-led output boom with no expansion of productive capacity. One 
example is the Ivory Coast, the World Bank’s poster child of the 1970s which 
thereafter became a disaster. Economists talk about a “Dutch disease” with big 
drops in domestic productive activity in wake of a foreign exchange bonanza. 
(The phrase was coined by the Economist magazine in 1977 in reference to de-
industrialization after natural gas discoveries in The Netherlands in the 1960s. 
Before the oil price crash late in 2008,Russia’s natural resource windfall over the 
preceding years was a leading example). The illness may flare up with 
contemporary efforts to scale up foreign aid to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
Foreign Capital Flows 
The instability of international (primarily financial) capital movements adds 
to the complications. Financial capital can take the form of both short- and long-
term loans from abroad and, more recently, portfolio investments used to acquire 
domestic assets such as real estate and equity. Local booms in “asset prices” 
(equity, real estate, and foreign holdings) can be generated by but can also 
induce such capital flows. National balance sheets develop “maturity 
mismatches” (the loans are short-term but are being used to acquire long-term 
assets) and “currency mismatches” (loans are in hard currency but local assets 
are valued in local currency). As with the Dutch disease, the local currency tends 
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to get stronger. Chapter 7 goes into detail about linkages between capital flows 
and the exchange rate. 
Internal financial flows can mimic these stock imbalances (Foley, 2003). A 
boom in investment (in real estate, for example) can outrun increases in profits. 
Firms are forced in the direction of borrowing to cover shortfalls in retained 
earnings as interest rates may be going up. In Minsky’s (1975) evocative 
terminology, financial flow positions shift from being “hedged” or rationally 
“speculative” toward an unstable “Ponzi” situation.12 
Evidently the stage is being set for a crash – new money will not keep 
arriving in increasing quantities forever. After a time, speculation against the 
financial mismatches and the strong exchange rate mounts, and a run follows. 
There were famous crises in Latin America’s “Southern Cone” (Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay) around 1980 and they continued through Mexico in 1994 and East Asia 
and Russia in the late 1990s, not to mention many other less publicized cases.13 
Episodes in Central and Eastern Europe in late 2008 are more recent examples. 
This recurring cycle is fed by changing perceptions about “emerging 
markets” by investors. Alternating bursts of “appetite for risk” (with developing 
country assets usually viewed as “risky”) and “flight to quality” (reduction in risky 
investments and increased demand for assets viewed as “safe”, particularly 
Treasury bonds of industrial countries) are common in financial markets as 
                                                 
12 In a bit more detail, a flow position is hedged if investment is less than gross 
profits and speculative if investment exceeds profits net of interest payments. 
With high investment, Ponzi finance comes in when profits fail to cover interest 
payments. 
13 Writing in draft form before the Southern Cone events, Roberto Frenkel (1983) 
presciently pointed out how they could come to pass. 
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opinions shift along lines discussed by Keynes (1936) in his famous “beauty 
context”.14 When emerging markets are in vogue, money pours in and interest 
rate “spreads”15 on borrowing narrow; the reverse happens when there is capital 
flight. Such volatility is exacerbated by “contagion,” meaning that groups of 
developing countries are pooled into risk categories in which probable financial 
returns are perceived (with or without empirical justification) to be strongly 
correlated.  
Exchange rate spreads also complicate monetary policy. If controls over 
capital movements are absent or weak, the domestic interest rate will tend to 
equalize with the foreign rate +  the spread + expected exchange rate 
depreciation. This “parity” rate will exacerbate the cycle, falling in an upswing as 
capital inflows come in large quantities, and rising in the crisis when capital flows 
out, in both cases frustrating efforts at counter-cyclical monetary interventions.16 
Macroeconomic Policy Space 
 Under the Washington consensus, macro policy design centered on with 
reducing inflation and/or external deficits, leaving aside the old focus of 
Keynesian policies on full employment and of development policies on 
investment and growth. “Inflation targeting” as a rationale for interest rate 
management by central banks is the most recent incantation with regard to the 
                                                 
14 A contest not to pick the most beautiful person (or asset) but rather to guess 
the person that average opinion will choose as the winner. 
15 Spreads are the premiums that countries must pay over international interest 
rates that are used as a reference for “safe” assets, particularly US Treasury 
bonds. 
16 The significance of parity rates was perhaps first pointed out Keynes (1923). 
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first objective, while a “twin deficit” view of external balance continues to 
dominate orthodox discourse about the balance of payments.17 Both lines of 
argument stress the need for fiscal and monetary austerity. But that can easily 
run counter to a developmental agenda.  
 As argued above, developmentalist goals are easier to reach under a 
favorable configuration of macroeconomic prices, specifically a low and stable 
real interest rate and a weak and stable real exchange rate. In relation to the 
level of activity, a stable fiscal position with a deficit (or surplus) consistent with 
the economy’s overall resource balance is also desirable.18  
Nonetheless, a cyclically stable fiscal position and a favorable macro price 
constellation are difficult to put into place, let alone maintain. The maintenance 
problem arises because both private (domestic and foreign) and government 
economic behavior in developing countries is often pro-cyclical. 
A basic reason why, as we have already pointed out, is the instability of 
external financing. Thus, during upswings the private sector or government may 
increase its spending more rapidly than income – precisely because financing is 
available. Aggregate demand will go up, feeding back into further output 
expansion and debt accumulation – evidently an unsustainable situation. When 
                                                 
17 See Chapter 7 for more on both inflation targeting and the theory of twin 
deficits. The latter says that reducing the fiscal deficit should lead to an improved 
external position. The data presented in Chapter 5 support no such linkage. 
18 As noted above, a convenient way to analyze resource balances is in terms of 
flows of net borrowing (= investment – saving = income – expenditure) of the 
public, foreign, and private sectors. As noted above, an important accounting rule 
is that net borrowing flows economy-wide must sum to zero. Its implications are 
developed in Chapters 5 and 7. 
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external financing is cut, aggregate demand will tend to decrease more rapidly 
than income, feeding the downswing.  
 Fiscal policy has traditionally been used for counter-cyclical purposes in 
rich countries. In the developing world, the practice can be more difficult. The 
authorities in an impoverished society cannot easily refuse to spend extra 
revenues during an upswing. This is even harder if local authorities were pressed 
by their lenders to adopt austerity programs during the preceeding crisis to 
generate “credibility” in financial markets. A consequence is that in a subsequent 
upswing, the authorities face strong political pressure to spend, and are only too 
happy to have breathing space to pursue expansionary policies. 
In relation to monetary and exchange rate policies, the authorities are 
often thought to confront a “trilemma” stating that central bank interventions 
cannot simultaneously combine (1) full capital mobility, (2) a controlled exchange 
rate, and (3) independent monetary policy. Supposedly, only two of these policy 
lines can be consistently maintained. 
 The trilemma as just stated is a textbook theorem which is, in fact, 
invalid.19 Even with free capital mobility, a central bank can in principle undertake 
transactions in both foreign exchange and domestic bond markets (not to 
mention other monetary control maneuvers) targeting both the interest and the 
exchange rates (Taylor, 2004; Frenkel, 2007). 
Nevertheless, something like a trilemma can exist in the eyes of financial 
markets. There are practical limits to the volume of interventions that a central 
                                                 
19 Appendix 7.1 goes into more detail on the failure of the trilemma and models of 
exchange rate determination more generally. 
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bank can practice, along with complicated feedbacks. In particular, central bank 
interventions to sterilize capital inflows or outflows may change interest rate 
expectations, whereas interventions in foreign exchange markets affect 
exchange rate expectations. These feedbacks may run counter to the objectives 
of monetary and foreign exchange policy.  
Overcoming the trilemma and running a truly independent monetary and 
foreign exchange policy are simpler when there is an excess supply of foreign 
exchange. When foreign exchange is constraining economic policy and 
economic activity, international reserves previously accumulated by the central 
bank also provides some “policy space” to overcome the trilemma, but such 
space is more limited, as it depends on external financing being available. 
The implication is that if it wishes to target the real exchange and interest 
rates, the central bank has to maintain tolerable control over the macroeconomic 
impacts of cross-border financial flows. As described in Chapter 7, measures are 
available for this task. They do not work perfectly, but can certainly moderate 
inflows during a boom and help to avoid an otherwise inevitable crash.20  
If there are capital outflows too large to manage with normal exchange 
rate and monetary policies, the authorities certainly do not want to engage in 
recession-triggering monetary contraction. If the exchange rate has been 
maintained at a relatively depreciated level, the external deficit is not setting off 
financial alarm bells, and inflation is under control, then there are no 
                                                 
20 This danger also exists in poor countries if a “boom” in aid inflows were to be 
suddenly cut off – by no means a geopolitical impossibility. The familiar “Dutch 
disease” analysis of adverse effects of foreign aid enters the discussion here. 
 29
  
“fundamental” reasons for market participants to expect a maxi-devaluation. 
Under such circumstances, the way for the authorities to maintain a policy regime 
consistent with targeted macro prices is to impose exchange controls and 





Institutions and the State 
The development and macroeconomic policies on which we focus in this 
book21 have to be developed within a given “institutional” framework of laws, 
political processes, and the general socio-cultural environment.22 We should start 
here by pointing out that in economic analysis the word “institutions” is used in at 
least two senses – as “rules of the game” and “organizations.” Examples are 
property rights on the one hand and a central bank on the other. Rules may be 
formalized as in law or be informal.23 They may or may not support growth and 
                                                 
21 Some attention is also paid to more humanly oriented educational, health, 
social protection, and distributive activities, although we do not address 
questions of how to extend “entitlements” or “freedoms”  to individuals as 
emphasized by Sen (2000), in part because their feedback effects on growth 
appear to be rather weak. 
22 The following discussion draws on papers collected in Chang (2007). 
23 Local, often tacit agreements governing exploitation of common property 
resources are important examples of the latter. Property rights in contemporary 
China (including those for town-and-village enterprises) are a complicated 




structural change. Similarly, the form of an institution such as an “independent” 
central bank may or may not lead it to function in a desirable way. 
 We don’t directly take on the question of how institutions evolve, but in 
principle they can either be imported (subject to indigenous modification) from 
abroad, as in Japan after its “opening” by Commodore Perry in 1854, or emerge 
largely subject to domestic forces. Context is of fundamental importance. 
“Mercantilist” institutions arose in nations seeking to escape the thralls of 
comparative advantage in producing raw materials. For Marx and Engels, 
technical change drove the transformation of feudalism into a mode of production 
(a cultural/institutional/technological complex) centered on the bourgeoisie. In 
macroeconomics, introducing the institution of wage and price indexation to 
ongoing inflation can lead to explosive price increases later on (an example of an 
institution with apparently desirable short-run effects on income distribution but 
having unforeseen, undesirable long-term repercussions).  
 At any point in time, an economy will operate within an institutional 
complex having a degree of stability – after all institutions are supposed to 
persist, at least for some duration. But to paraphrase Marx, people change 
institutions although not in an institutional environment of their own choosing. 
Policy-makers can attempt to facilitate useful changes, but institutions 
themselves make up an important component of the structural limitations within 




 Thinking about institutions as factors that must be understood as fencing 
in available policy choices in differing national contexts differs sharply from much 
recent academic literature in development economics – e.g. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2005) on Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (a title 
drawn from that of the classic book by the historical sociologist Barrington Moore 
Jr., whose own ideas about evolving institutions are discussed below). They and 
similar authors focus on the rule of law and efficient private property rights à la 
North (1990), which are supposed to cut back on “transactions costs” associated 
with economic activity. Getting rid of corruption and improving quality of 
“governance” are other favored metrics for a country’s ability to undertake 
growth-promoting policy changes. 
This diagnosis is rooted in an old idea in economics – that “agents” simply 
maximize their utility or profits subject to a given set of constraints. Causality 
clearly runs from culture (Confucianism, the Protestant Ethic, etc.), natural 
endowments – and who controls them —, technology, and existing institutions to 
economic development. That agents themselves may have “agency” in the 
modification of institutions and that development itself can stimulate institutional 
and technological change does not always enter the picture. As noted above, this 
evolutionary process takes place within an existing historical context. Attempts 
on the part of international donor and financial organizations to introduce alien 
(usually ersatz Anglo-Saxon) institutions “as recommended by economic theory” 
can very easily backfire. 
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A key version of the mainstream view, tracing back to before Adam Smith, 
first clearly stated by the “Austrian” school from Vienna in the 1870s, and 
trumpeted for developing countries in extreme form by de Soto (2000), asserts 
that rapid growth can only emerge from private entrepreneurship under clear 
property rights protection. Austrian economists do not recognize the state as a 
potential entrepreneur or as a supporter of entrepreneurship. 
 In less strident versions, the Austrian argument dominates much current 
discussion of aid and development policy, especially among major donors. The 
“Washington consensus,” now in remission, strongly emphasized private sector 
initiatives and strict limits on state guidance of the economy. Over the past two or 
three decades many foreign aid and development policy packages informed by 
the consensus did not generate linkages among demand growth, productivity, 
and employment. In a classic example of “blame the victim,” mainstream 
economics has recently been hinting that poor institutions and governance are 
the reasons why its own policies over the past two or three decades have not 
succeeded in stimulating growth. To put the reasoning childishly: “We gave you 
good policies, they didn’t work, so it’s your fault because of your terrible 
institutions.” 
 
Theories of Capitalism 
 This discussion brings us to the broader debate on the role of the state in 
a market-oriented economy. In this debate, there is a fundamental confusion 
between theories of capitalism, on the one hand, and analysis of what the state 
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can do and does, on the other. In the Communist Manifesto, for example, Marx 
and Engels tell us that “[t]he executive of the modern state is but a committee for 
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” This statement may or 
may not be correct but says nothing about how the executive committee handles 
its day-to-day operations or even what they are. 
At the other end of the political spectrum, the Coase (1960) “theorem” 
(really an informal statement of principle) claims that, in the absence of 
transaction costs, all government allocations of property rights are equally 
efficient, because interested parties will bargain privately to correct any 
externality. Adherents further believe that transactions are in fact inexpensive or 
else think that the state should devote all its efforts to driving the costs down. 
Coase’s ideas strongly influenced North and followers in their emphasis on 
property rights as the basic institutional foundation of modern capitalism. 
Somewhere in the middle, the World Bank at various times has asserted, 
following dominant institutional analysis as applied to development and outlined 
above, that “market friendliness” is the skeleton key to successful economic 
development. That recommendation is not far from saying that the state should 
just act to make transactions easier, really putting the Bank closer to the second 
view outlined above. 
 Neither Marx nor Coase marks the end of the day in the discussion of 
capitalism. There are many theories which most economists have never 
encountered, let alone contemplated in a serious way. To have a sensible 
discussion of the state in a capitalist economy, it is essential to ask what a 
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capitalist economy is. In so doing, we necessarily enter into an “over-determined” 
situation, with too many explanations for a single reality.24 All we can do here is 
sketch a few approaches to capitalism which may be of use in dealing with 
practical policy issues. 
 Marx and Engels are presumably well enough known not to need 
discussion. For present purposes their emphasis on relatively well-defined social 
groups and on how they limit possibilities for economic change is precisely to the 
point. Capitalism becomes a system of institutionalized strife among the 
competing groups (Collins, 1980).  
This way of looking at the world resonates with a large school of socio-
economic historians. The doyen, Karl Polanyi (1944), emphasized that the state 
is the central economic actor: “The road to the free market [in Western Europe] 
was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally 
organized and controlled interventionism” (p. 140). In Polanyi’s view, the 
institutions that support capitalism arise from within the society which also 
defends itself against the worst excesses such as slavery and child labor. A 
“double movement” of creating and then regulating market institutions occurs 
system-wide, with the state as the superordinate actor. 
States, of course, can fail – in many dimensions. They operate under 
fundamental uncertainty, and may or may not respond to uneven advances in 
different sectors, disproportionalities, and balance of payments and inflationary 
                                                 
24 The idea goes back to Freud, who thought that the content of dreams was 
shaped by factors ranging from recent events in the dreamer’s life (“the residue 
of the day”) to repressed traumas and unconscious wishes. It has been influential 
in fields ranging from literary criticism to Marxist political theory. 
 35
  
pressures, as well as the social tensions that inevitably arise in the development 
process (Hirschman, 1958). They can try to do too much, achieving little. They 
can become purely predatory, as in countless petty dictatorships around the 
world. But when backward economies do catch up, the process is mediated by 
the state, in particular on the basis of administrative guidance practiced by an 
autonomous bureaucracy accepted by (and embedded in) the society overall.  
Power relationships among collective actors are central to the strife. 
Barrington Moore (1966) pursues a comparative-historical analysis of how 
interactions among lords and peasants, bourgeoisie and the state gave rise to 
nineteenth and twentieth century economic and political structures (bourgeois 
revolutionary, capitalist reactionary, and communist in his classification) which 
constrain economic policy. 
He has many counterpart sociological historians. Tilly (1992), for example, 
sets up a model involving the degree of coercion imposed by the state and the 
stock of capital. As in any model, there are oversimplifications. He emphasizes 
two: metonymy through which the actions of the “ruler” summarize all the 
activities of the state, and reification meaning that all groups of actors have 
unitary interests. 
From this perspective, there can be an equilibrium between the degree of 
coercion and the capital stock. There is a long-term reduction in the power to 
coerce as accumulation proceeds and there are also decreasing returns to 
coercion itself. There are many possible outcomes: a “capital-intensive” 
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trajectory, a “coercion-intensive” path, and a “capitalized coercion” path in 
between.  
In the history of the European state system, Russia and Poland were 
coercion-intensive while the Italian city-states and the Netherlands concentrated 
on accumulation. The large Western European countries – Britain, France, 
Spain, and Prussia – practiced capitalized coercion. The Nordics were initially 
coercive but veered toward capitalized coercion in the eighteenth century. In line 
with Gerschenkron’s (1962) emphasis on how relative “backwardness” conditions 
the possibilities for economic development, there was an implicit division of 
control of the economy between the state and private actors along all these 
paths. As discussed below, there is always a tension in policy formation between 
the clumsy thumb of the state with its powers of coercion and the nimble fingers 
of capitalists who can deal with their own concerns but lack power and ignore or, 
at least, do not fully internalize the need to improve social relationships more 
generally. 
Continuing with the theme of overdetermination, there is a long tradition of 
seeing the birth of capitalism as the result of certain mental attitudes, with Adam 
Smith’s “propensity to truck and barter” being an important early entry in the list. 
Another famous example is Max Weber’s invocation of the protestant ethic which 
he said meant that a believer felt the need to prove (not earn) his right to eternal 
salvation through methodical labor and restrained consumption. The 
entrepreneurial spirit emphasized by the Austrian school is another variation on 
that theme. There is also the confusing discussion on Confucianism in East Asia. 
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Weber thought that this belief system held back China’s development while 
recently it has been touted as a major factor underlying the growth of the Tigers. 
The French Annales school of historians, with their emphasis on the 
histoire des mentalités, represents the peak of this line of analysis. Fernand 
Braudel’s (1979) fascinating three volumes on Capitalism and Material Life go 
into minute detail on how people made economies work. Braudel mixes more or 
less standard economics material with much description of the social impact of 
economic events on everyday life, and pays great attention to food, fashion, 
social customs, and many other themes. Slaves, serfs, and peasants play the 
major roles in his history, not capitalists and kings. 
In yet another line of history, individual actors are overwhelmed by 
disease, geography, or the environment. On the coercion side of the equation, in 
an important book McNeill (1976) pointed out that disease resistance won and 
lost wars (recall the effect of smallpox in permitting the conquest of Mexico by 
Cortes). Populations expanded when they had dealt with epidemic disease either 
by learning how to prevent it or developing immunity. Epidemics profoundly 
shaped subsequent economic history, as with the plague in Europe. 
The idea that geography and the environment interact in determining 
economic destiny dates to antiquity (the Greek geographer Strabo wrote that 
climate influences the psychological disposition of different races) and has 
cropped up many times since. The latest blockbuster is Jared Diamond’s (1999) 
Guns, Germs, and Steel, which makes a strong ecologically based argument for 
the dominance of Eurasian societies in the world. They pioneered domestication 
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and the use of food grains, and therefore reaped the benefits. The unstated 
message is that sustained economic growth may not be on the cards for the 
geographically disenfranchised regions of the world – much of Africa, the 
Americas, and Austronesia. Most economists would beg to differ, but could they 
be wrong? 
Against this bright and varied firmament of ideas, current mainstream 
economists’ views of the factors underlying capitalism do not shine very strongly. 
Property rights are no doubt an important aspect of capitalist development, but 
attempting to make them into the central institutional factor is idle if not entirely 
misplaced.  
 
What the State Can Do 
 Suppose that the overdetermined socioeconomic system throws up some 
sort of market economy in a country with a state that has some power of coercion 
or “authority” in the usage of Charles Lindblom (1977) in his classic book on 
Politics and Markets. How can it use the authority to guide the economy 
successfully? 
 An initial point, already mentioned above, is that coercion or authority is all 
thumbs, perhaps strong ones, but thumbs nevertheless. The state is not as good 
as the market in terms of economic initiative and resourcefulness. As a 
consequence, in growing economies the state delegates some of its authority 
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over the economy to market actors. Perhaps with difficulty, it always has the 
power to take it back.25 
Market actors, on the other hand, can sustain economic growth if 
adequately directed and restrained from mere cupidity. But there are costs 
associated. Standard property rights make capitalists the owners of enterprises, 
with vast consequences for the distribution of wealth and political power, access 
to the government, control of the media, job rights, alienation, and social conflict. 
But if adult non-capitalists can use their own property rights to hold money or 
physical assets, then they can (to an extent) pay capitalists to use nimble fingers 
to produce goods and services to satisfy their needs. The market can fulfill this 
function more effectively than the state. But it cannot deliver many public goods 
on its own, in which case compulsion, coercion, or guidance may be required. 
 In practice, then, there are two sets of authorities – government officials 
and businesspeople. They share an interest in system stability which in a poor 
country necessarily requires economic growth per capita. The issue at hand is 
how growth can be attained. About the only tools available involve cooperation 
and mutually reinforcing feedback between the two groups of actors, best with a 
voice for peasant, workers and households as well. The ways the tools can be 
                                                 
25 Central banks are an interesting example in this regard. An “independent” 
central bank is a quasi-market actor because it can set interest rates on its own, 
in principle without consulting the rest of the government (though of course it is 
subject to political pressure). But historically central banks were created to 
manage activities previously exercised by the private sector – e.g., the US 
Federal Reserve took over the role of lender of last resort played by the banker J. 







used will differ across time and space but the examples presented above, and in 
the chapters that follow, show that they can be effective. 
